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REJOINDERS TO HART ON RULES AND
RIGHTS
Stanley L. Paulson*
LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

H.L.A. HART. Edited by P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz. Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press. 1977. Pp. viii, 312.
$16.50.

In the concluding chapter of The Vocabulary of Politics
(1947), the British philosopher, T.D. Weldon, wrote that "the
questions of traditional political philosopliy" are simply
"confused formulations of purely empirical difficulties." 1 Weldon's remark reflected the sad state of political philosophy immediately following the War, and the situation in legal philosophy
was not much better. Although American Legal Realism in its
heyday had had some of the trappings of a movement, 2 it never
recovered from the extraordinarily naive "scientist" experiments
in the early 1930s at the Jbhns Hopkins Institute of Law and at
Yale (where Underhill Moore conducted studies on parking}. 3
And though elements of the traditional natural law theory were
evident in American work on "constitutionalism,"4 that work was
largely historical; taken on the merits, the traditional natural law
theory has had few apologists in Anglo-American legal philosophy. Finally, although some branches of analytical philosophy
were alive and well in the early post-War period, 5 moral philosophy, like political philosophy, had been all but killed by the
barren "emotive theory of value," a corollary of earlier versions
of the logical positivists' verification principle. 6
• Associate Professor of Philosophy, Washington University (St. Louis). Ph.D.1968,
University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. 1972, Harvard University.-Ed.
1. T.D. WELDON, THE VOCABULARY OF POLITICS 192 (1947).
2. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1233-34 (1931).
3. See generally W. TwlNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 56-69
(1973). "The image of Underhill Moore sitting on a camp stool in Bermuda shorts in the
streets of New Haven solemnly counting cars," id. at 65, reflects something of the disdain
of the academic law profession for Moore's enterprise but is, as Twining goes on to argue,
less than fair.
4. See, e.g., C. MclLwAIN, CoNSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (rev. ed. 1947).
5. One thinks, for example, of contributions to the philosophy of language, e.g., R.
CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY (1947).
6. On the logical positivists' verification principle, see A. J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH
AND Lome 133-45 (2d ed. 1946). On the implications of the verification principle for morn!
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The scene has changed dramatically in the years since Weldon's The Vocabulary of Politics. In political philosophy, John
Rawls's monumental A Theory of Justice (1971) has created anew
the field of normative political philosophy. In legal philosophy,
Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977) is eloquent testimony to the role played by his predecessor in the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford, H.L.A. Hart-it was, after all, Hart's legal
positivism, and his theory of adjudication in particular, that set
the stage for Dworkin's arguments.7 More generally, Hart's work
marks a rebirth of legal philosophy in the English-speaking countries. In his 1971 inaugural lecture at Oxford, Dworkin observed
that "[t]he province of jurisprudence is now the province
[Hart] has travelled," 8 thereby calling to mind the locus
classicus 'of legal positivism, John Austin's The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), and suggesting something of the
magnitude of Hart's achievement.
The present collection, a Festschrift in honor of Professor
Hart on his seventieth birthday, brings together papers written
by Hart's colleagues, former students, and other "devotees," as
the editors put it. The contributions, of high quality and considerable diversity in subject and style, are evidence of the transformation wrought by Hart in the thirty years since Weldon's pronouncement. The sixteen papers incfude several concerned primarily with Hart's legal philosophy, especially as developed in
The Concept of Law (1961). Others are on fundamental concepts
in the law (for example, rights), and still others are on problems
in moral philosophy. 9
philosophy, see id. at 87-102. Hempel, Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion
of Meaning, 4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 41 (1950), reprinted in LoGICAL
POSITIVISM 108 (A. J. Ayer ed. 1959), is a useful critical statement.
7. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 121-50 (1961) [hereinafter cited as THE
CONCEPT OF LAw].
8. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
9. Along with the papers I discuss below, the Festschrift includes: G.P. Baker,
Defeasibility and Meaning; B.M. Barry, Justice Between Generations; R. Cross, The
House of Lords and the Rules of Precedent; R.M. Dworkin, No Right Answer?; J. Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest; J.M. Finnis, Scepticism, Self-Refutation, and the Good of
Truth; P.R. Foot, Approval and Disapproval; P.M.S. Hacker, Hart's Philosophy of Law;
A.J.P. Kenny, Intention and Mens Rea in Murder; J.R. Lucas, The Phenomenon of Law;
J.L. Mackie, The Grounds of Responsibility; G. Marshall, Positivism, Adjudication, and
Democracy; J. Raz, Promises and Obligations; and R.S. Summers, Naive Instrumentalism and the Law.
The editors have added a bibliography of Hart's published writings, to which the
following omissions and recent additions may be appended (in chronological order): Book
Review, 70 LAW Q. REv. 115 (1954) (review of W. FruEDMANN, LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
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Rather than survey the lot, I have selected two themes in
Hart's legal philosophy for closer examination: the topic of legal
rules-in particular, the question of distinct types of legal
rules-and the topic of rights. A.M. Honore, Hart's collaborator
on a major work, Causation in the Law (1959), and, more recently the author of several highly original papers in jurisprudence, 10 has written another such paper for the Festschrift, namely
"Real Laws." Honore challenges Hart's now familiar taxonomy of
duty-imposing and power-conferring rules (or, what is not quite
the same thing to Hart, primary and secondary rules) 11 and offers
instead a very different scheme drawn from "professional" (that
is, legal) rather than "philosophical" discourse. I raise questions
about the distinction between two types of legal rules, beginning
with a look at the arguments that Hart offers for his celebrated
distinction. These arguments, I contend, do not fare as well as the
distinction itself. I then turn to Honore's taxonomy of legal rules,
looking at the results and also at Honore's motivation for working
along lines so unlike Hart's.
The other theme I have chosen to examine, that of rights, is
equally familiar-is, indeed, the dominant theme in much current work in legal philosophy. 12 In his Festschrift contribution,
CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN (1951)); Causation in the Law (with A.M. Honore), 72 LAW Q, REv,
58, 260, 398 (1956); Should the Death Penalty Be Abolished?, 66 THE LISTENER 87 (1956);
A View of America, 59 THE LISTENER 89 (1958);-Austin's Influence, 78 OXFORD MAGAZINE
206 (1960); Jurisprudence, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND
PHILOSOPHERS 143 (1st ed. J.O. Urmson 1960); Book Rev,iew, 69 PHIL. REv. 270 (1960)
(review of H. KANroROWlCZ, THE DEFINmOA OF LAw (1958)); Duty, in A DlCTlONARY OF
THE SocIAL SCIENCES 213 (J. Gould & W. Kolb eds. 1964); Book Review, 74 YALE L.J. 1326
(1965) (review of B. WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1963)); Austin, John, in 1
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SocIAL SclENCES 471 (2d ed. 1967); Austin, John, in 2
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 772 (14th ed. 1970); Bentham and the United States of
America, 19 J. LAw & EcoN. 547 (1976); American Jurisprudence through English Eyes:
The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969 (1977); J. BENTHAM, A COMMENT
ON THE COMMENTARIES and A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds.
1977); Morality and Reality, N .Y. REv. BooKs, March 9, 1978, at 35 (review of G. HARMAN,
THE NATURE OF MoRALITY: AN lNrnoDUCTlON TO ETHICS (1977) and J.L. MACKIE, ETH1cs:
lNvEsTING RlGHT AND WRONG (1977)); Between Utility and Rights, 79 CoLUM, L. REv.
(forthcoming) (John Dewey Lecture, Columbia Law School).
10. Honore: Groups, Laws, and Obedience, in OXFORD EssAYB IN JURISPRUDENCE (SEC•
OND SERlES) 1 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973); Honore', What is a Group?, 61 ARcmv FOR
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHlLOSOPHlE 161 (1975).
11. See THE CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 7, at 26-48, 77-96.
12. See, e.g., R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RmHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), and the critical response
to Dworkin, which includes the papers in the Jurisprudence Symposium, 11 GA. L. REv.
(1977), held on the occasion of H.L.A. Hart's Sibley Lecture at the University of Georgia
School of Law, and also: Finnis, Some Professorial Fallacies about Rights, 4 ADELAIDE L.
REv. 377 (1972); Levinson, Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on "Thinking Like a Lawyer", 30 STAN. L. REv. 1071 (1978) (review ofR. DwoRKIN, supra); MacCormick, Dworkin
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"Rights and Legislation," D.N. MacCormick, Regius Professor of
Public Law at the University of Edinburgh and author of Legal
Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) in the Clarendon Law Series,
develops a powerful critique of Hart's "will" theory oflegal rights.
He goes on to offer arguments on behalf of a competing theory,
the "interest" theory, and I examine those arguments at some
length.

I.

HART ON Two TYPES OF LEGAL RULES
Hart's arguments for two types of legal rules are developed
in the course of a powerful critique of John Austin, historically
the most influential proponent of classical legal positivism. 13 Austin suppo.sed that there was but one type of legal norm, namely
the command. In the opening lecture of the Province, he provides
a generic characterization of the command, inviting attention to
its three components: (i) the commander's intention that a party
act or forbear from acting in a particular way, (ii) the commander's expression of his intention to the party, and (iii) the
commander's power to impose a sanction if the commanded party
should fail to comply with the directive. 14 The differentiae that
tum this characterization of the genus, namely the command,
into a characterization of one species of command, namely positive law, include: (iv) the identification of the commander as the
sovereign or as an agent of the sovereign and (v) the formal requirement that the command be general, ranging over the acts of
a class, rather than particular.15 For Austin, positive laws are
commands thus defined, and he recognizes no other type of legal
norm.
PROBLEMS FOR

as Pre-Benthamite, 87 PHIL. REv. 585 (1978); N. MAcCORMICK, LEGAL REAsoNING AND
LEGAL THEORY 229-64 (1978); Raz, Professor Dworkin's Theory of Rights, 26 POLITICAL
STtJD. 123 (1978); Richards, Taking Taking Rights Seriously Seriously: Reflections on
Dworkin and the American Revival of Natural Law,"52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265 (1977); Soper,
Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REv.
473 (1977); Note, Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", 74 MICH. L. REv. 1167 (1976).
13. While Austin has been the most influential figure historically, a reassessment in
recent years of Bentham's place in jurisprudence has established him as the foremost
analytical jurist in the English tradition. See generally R.W.M. DIAB, JURISPRUDENCE 45769 (4th ed. 1976); Hart, Bentham's "Of Laws in General", in 2 RECHTSTHEORIE 55 (1971),
and in 2 CAMBRIAN L. REv. 24 (1971). On Hart's fundamental contribution to the reassessment, see text at notes 52-53 infra.
14. J. AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 17 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954).
First published in 1832, the Province consists of the first six lectures of what was published
posthumously in two volumes as the LECI'URES ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. R. Campbell
1885).
16. J. AusTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 14, at 193-216, 18-23.
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Hart's response to Austin seems clear enough. A single model
for norms, according to which all are general commands, will not
do. Alongside commands or duty-imposing rules, there are powerconferring rules, a distinct type of legal norm. Some rules of the
latter type empower individuals to enter into contracts, draw up
wills, transfer titles, and the like; some empower legal officials to
promulgate laws, adjudicate disputes, and so on. The distinction
between the two types oflegal norms, as Hart takes pains to show,
is the "radical difference in function between laws that confer
such powers"I 9 on the one hand and, on the other, laws that
impose duties on individuals, such as, for example, the rules of a
criminal code. As Hart puts it in the case of private law powerconferring rules, "they provide individuals with facilities for realizing their wishes," enabling them "to create, by certain specified
procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures of rights
and duties within the coercive framework of the law." 17
Hart's distinction between the two types of rules has been
generally acclaimed, but the argumen~. he offers in support of it
are questionable. Each of his arguments may be understood as a
reply to a "monistic" position according to which there is but one
norm-type and, therefore, no occasion for distinguishing dutyimposing and power-conferring rules as distinct types. The first
monistic position adumbrated by Hart is not expressly defended
by anyone in legal philosophy, though writers of very different
persuasions have tacitly endorsed it. Is I will speak here of an
unnamed "nullity-theorist" who argues that the so-called powerconferring rules are simply a special case of the duty-imposing
rule-an argument that turns on a particular interpretation of
nullity. The second monistic position that Hart examines has
been defended at length by members of the Vienna School of
Legal Philosophy. 19 In particular, Hans Kelsen argues (as Hart
16. Tm: CoNCEPr OF LAw, supra note 7, at 28.
17. Id. at 27.
18. In id. at 239, Hart suggests that J. AusTIN, LECTURES, supra note 14, at 452-57,
"adopts but does not develop" such a monistic position. See also H.M. HART & A.M,
SACKS, Tm: LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 1N THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 149
(tent. ed. 1958).
19. See Merkl, Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues, in
GESELL'>CHAFr, STAAT UND RECHT 252 (A. Verdross ed. 1931), reprinted in 2 DIE WIENER
RECHTSTHEORETlSCHE ScHULE 1311 (H. Klecatsky, et al., eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
WIENER SCHULE]; H. KELBEN, GENERAL Tm:oRY OF LAw AND STATE 58-62, 143-44 (A. Wedberg trans. 1945); H. KEU!EN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE §§ 5(a), 6(b), (e), 16-18, 35(d) (2d ed.
1960) [hereinafter cited as REINE RECHTSLEHRE]. (The English translation of the Reine
Rechtslehre (M. Knight trans. 1967) is inaccurate at some points and incomplete as well,
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understands him) that power-conferring rules are parts of a composite duty-imposing rule.
A. Hart's nullity-theorist20
The nullity-theorist compares the untoward consequence of
failing to comply with a duty-imposing rule, namely a sanction,
with the untoward consequence of failing to satisfy the conditions
specified in a power-conferring rule, namely a nullity. In the end,
sanction and nullity come to the same thing. Hart replies that the
comparison is grossly misleading. While the sanction is only contingently related to the duty-imposing rule, that is, a failure to
comply may or may not be followed by a sanction, the nullity
follows n(;lcessarily upon a failure to satisfy the conditions of the
power-conferring rule. 21
Now it seems entirely proper to resist, as Hart does, the
nullity-theorist's effort deliberately to conflate duty-imposing
and power-conferring rules, but the question remains: Has Hart
shown the two to be different? Not, I think, when he says that
the nullity follows necessarily upon a failure to satisfy the conditions of a power-conferring rule. For in the case of adjudicative
and public law power-conferring rules, the consequence of nullity
is only contingently related to a failure to satisfy one or more of
the conditions specified in the rule. Hart himself is clear on the
matter.
If a would-be testator omits to sign or obtain two witnesses to his

will, what he writes has no legal status or effect. A court's order is
not, however, treated in this way even if it is plainly one outside
the jurisdiction of the court to make. It is obviously in the interests
of public order that a court's decision should have legal authority
until a superior court certifies its invalidity, even if it is one which
the court should not legally have given. 22

Hart's view of the consequences of failing to satisfy conditions of
public law power-conferring rules is well-taken. The alternative,
to suppose that a failure to satisfy all the conditions of adjudication renders a judge's holding eo ipso null and void, would undermine legal certainty. 23 How, in a given instance, are we to know
Quotations in the text at notes 29 and 35 infra are my own translations, and they along
with other references to the Reine Rechtslehre are cited by section number rather than
page number to facilitate reference to the English translation.)
20. See Tm: CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 7, at 33-35.
21. Id. at 34-35.
22. Id. at 30.
23. By "legal certainty" I have in mind not predictability but rather, the capacity of

490

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:484

that a condition of adjudication has not obtained? More fundamentally, how are the various determinate conditions of adjudication in a given proceeding to be identified? Since our inability
conclusively to answer such questions would threaten the certainty of the law-would, that is, if our answers had any impact-we are, with Hart (and the received opinion), better off
viewing a failure to satisfy the conditions of the public law powerconferring rules on the one hand, and the consequence thereof on
the other, as only contingently related. A failure to satisfy these
conditions renders the rule subject to invalidation, but does not
render it null and void. 24
But if Hart takes seriously his own professed position on the
public power-conferring rule, as, I have argued, he must, it is hard
to see how he has any reply to the nullity-theorist. For he contends, in his rejoinder to the nullity-theorist, that the nullity is
necessarily, and the sanction only contingently linked to its corresponding rule-type. The rejoinder is inconsistent with his own
correct statement that a failure to satisfy the conditions of a
public law power-conferring rule is only contingently related to
the consequence thereof.

B. Hart on Kelsen's hypothetical legal norm 25
Hart's second antagonist is Hans Kelsen-in Hart's own
words, "the most stimulating writer on analytical jurisprudence
of our day." 26 Kelsen's theory of legal norms, developed in the
book from which Hart draws, the General Theory of Law and
State (1945), and in the Reine Rechtslehre (2d ed. 1960), 27 in no
way denies, as Austin had, a role for power-conferring rules.
Rather, Kelsen treats power-conferring rules as "fragments" or
the legal system to provide a dispositive answer to questions of legal validity at any
juncture in the legal process. The legal positivists' rejoinder to those in the natural law
tradition who would deny legal certainty is instructive here. See, e.g., J. AusTIN, PROVINCE,
supra note 14, at 184-86; T. HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT
OF THE COMMON LAws OF ENGLAND 54-55 (J. Cropsey ed. 1971); G. RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILO·
SOPHIE 164-65 (8th ed. E. Wolf & H.-P. Schneider 1973). For an examination of the role
this peculiarly legal notion of certainty plays in the theory of legal validity, see Paulson,
Neue Grundlagen filr einen Begriff der Rechtsgeltung, 65 ARcHIV FOR REcHTS- UNO SozIAL•
PHILOSOPHIE 1 (1979).
24. See generally Kelsen, Uber Staatsunrecht, 40 ZEITSCHRIFT FiiR DAS PRIVAT· UNO
OFFENTLICHE RECHT DER GEGENWART 1, 47-95 (1914), reprinted in 1 WIENER ScHULE, supra
note 19, at 957, 998-1040.
25. See THE CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 7, at 35-41.
26. Hart, Kelsen Visited, 10 UCLA L. REv. 709, 728 (1963).
27. See note 19 supra.
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parts of more complex rules that are formulated hypothetically.
As Hart puts it, "[a]ll genuine laws, on [Kelsen's] view, are
conditional orders to officials to apply sanctions. They are all of
the form, 'If anything of a kind X is done or omitted or happens,
then apply sanction of a kind Y.; " 28 By building all of the conditions for the application of the "conditional order" into the antecedent, Kelsen says, we are able to spell out the ways, substantive
and procedural, in which the entire legal order impinges on a
given application of law. Kelsen's own sketch of what he terms a
complete legal norm (vollstiindige Rechtsnorm), that is, a hypothetical legal norm embracing all of the antecedent conditions,
looks like this:
If an official whose appointment is governed by a general .legal
norm has established in a procedure prescribed by a general legal
norm that facts are present with which a general legal norm associates a certain sanction, then this official, in a proceeding prescribed by a general norm, ought to impose a sanction as provided
in the aforementioned general legal norm. 29

As with his reply to the nullity.Jtheorist, Hart's objection to
Kelsen strikes a sympathetic chord, at least initially. For Kelsen's complete legal norm does seem to culminate in the duty to
impose a sanction. And this effort "to reduce apparently distinct
varieties of legal rule to a single form alleged to convey the quintessence of law," Hart contends, "distort[s] the difrerent social
functions- which different types of legal rule perform." 30
But Hart's judgment seriously misleads, I think, on two
counts. First, Kelsen does speak of conferrals of power, that is,
of authorizing norms (ermiichtigende Normen), and of their
"social function" too; 31 he and Hart differ not on the presence of
a power-conferring function in the law, but rather, on the connection between that function and the form, or type, of norm with
which the function is associated. Hart's view is that distinct functions correspond to distinct norm-types, while for Kelsen distinct
functions are found within a single, composite norm-type. 32 Does
Hart have a basis for criticizing Kelsen here? Only if he is prepared to argue for the truth of his assumption that distinct func28. THE CoNCEPI' OF.LAW, supra note 7, at 35.
29. REINE REcHTSLEHRE, supra note 19, § 35(d).
30. THE CoNCEPI' OF LAw, supra note 7, at 38.
31. REINE REcHTSLEHRE, supra note 19, §§ 4(d), 29(d), 34(b),(c).
32. Id. § 4(b),(d); Kelsen, Vom Geltungsgrund des Rechts, in VllLKERRECHT UND
RECHTLICHES WELTBILD 157 (F.A. v.d. Heydte, et al., eds. 1960), reprinted in 2 WIENER
ScHULE, supra note 19, at 1417.
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tions correspond to distinct norm-types-and that he has not
done. Absent argument, any criticism that turns on his assumption simply begs the question.
Still, the question of form and function aside, is Hart not
correct in concluding that Kelsen's hypothetical legal norm is in
error because it culminates in the duty to impose a sanction? This
question invites attention to the second way in which Hart's reading of Kelsen misleads. Consider, for the sake of simplicity, a
short version of Kelsen's hypothetical legal norm:
If a legal subject fails to do x, then a legal official ought to impose
a certain sanction.

In all of Kelsen's talk about norms, the "ought" is to be regarded
as akin to a variable expression, subject to different interpretations for different normative modalities. 33 In the case of the hypothetical legal norm (above), Kelsen understands the "ought" as
imputing (zurechnen) liability to the subject, and the liability of
the subject marks, in turn, a conferral of power on the official. 34
The subject is legally liable to the imposition of the sanction, and
the official is empowered to impose it. But is the official simply
empowered to impose the sanction, or is he commanded to do so?
As Kelsen sees it, ifhe is commanded to impose the sanction, that
fact has to be reflected in a second norm-one that imposes a
duty on the official to impose the sanction. Generally, "[t]he
imposition of the sanction [by an official] is commanded
[geboten] . . . if its nonimposition is the condition of a sanction.
Where this is not the case, the sanction is only authorized
[ermachtigt], not commanded. " 35
The result, then, is that the satisfaction of the conditions of
the hypothetical legal norm marks, in every case, a conferral of
power on a legal official, but not necessarily a command. 36 But if
so, Hart's criticism of Kelsen might well be turned on its head.
That is, to pursue Hart's critique, namely that Kelsen's hypothetical norm "distorts" the law by emphasizing one function of
the law at the expense of others, would require the interpretation
that Kelsen has unduly emphasized the power-conferring function of the law, not the duty-imposing function.
But all of this talk about which function of law is to be
33.
34.
35.
36.

REINE REcHTSLEHRE, supra note 19, § 4(b).
Id. § 18.
Id. § 5(a).

See J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE 112-46 (1978).

77-85 (1970). Contra, R. MooRE,
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emphasized is, in the case of Kelsen, misleading. For it suggests
that Kelsen, like Austin, offers but a single legal function while
Hart offers several. In fact Kelsen offers separate functions within
a single, composite norm, while Hart offers separate functions
associated with separate norms. And Hart has given us no reason
to prefer his scheme over Kelsen's.

IL

HONORE'S "PROFESSIONAL" TAXONOMY OF RULES

Whatever one makes of the philosophical exchange between
Hart and Kelsen, pitched as it is at a vezy abstract level, Hart is
no doubt right when he remarks that "[a] fully detailed taxonomy of the varieties of law comprised in a modern legal system"
(as distinct from his own taxonomy in terms of two norm-types)
"still remains to be accomplished."37 A.M. Honore, in his important Festschrift paper, "Real Laws," develops some of the details
of a taxonomy of the varieties of law.
·
Honore's paper is prompted, in part, by his sharp reaction to
the idea, evident in the work of Jeremy Bentham and of Honore's
Oxford colleague (and co-editor of the Festschrift), Joseph Raz,
that behind the statutes and judicial decisions of the positive law
lie more fundamental "''logical' or 'ideal' legal units" that are
"the ultimate furniture of the legal universe" (p. 100). As Raz
puts it (quoting at several points from Bentham):
"The discovery that a law is not identical with a statute or a section in ·a statute etc., that many statutes from all the branches of
the law, including civil as well as penal law contribute to the
content of every law, was the most important turning-point in
Bentham's thinking on legal philosophy. This discovery and the
problems it raised were crystallized in one central question:
"Wherein consists the identity and completeness of a law?" And
again "What is a law? What are the parts of a law? The subject of
the questions, it is to be observed, is the logical, the ideal, the
intellectual whole, not the physical one: the law and not the
statute. " 38

In Bentham, the idea that the law is ultimately to be understood
within a framework of "real entities" more fundamental than the
"physical laws" of the statute books and judicial reporters is
spelled out in terms of two principles: first, that every law imposes duties (to act or to forbear from acting) and second, that
37. THE CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 7, at 32.
38. J. RAz, supra note 36, at 71, quoted atp.100 (citingJ. BENTHAM, AN!NTRooucnoN
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALS AND LEGISLATION 122, 429 (J .H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.
1970)) (emphasis, here and in subsequent quotations, is in original) (footnotes omitted).
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act-situations provide the basis for the individuation of legal
norms, which is to say that "every act-situation governed by the
law is the core of a separate law" (p. 103).
Honore regards the effort to distinguish or individuate legal
norms according to Bentham's principles as a "wild-goose chase"
{p. 100). He rejects the notions that all laws impose duties and
that laws are individuated by appeal to the principle of actindividuation. Arguments against the first of Bentham's principles are familiar from Hart's The Concept of Law, in which, as
we have seen, power-conferring rules are developed as a distinct
type of legal rule, a type not reducible to duty-imposing rules.
But Bentham's second principle, namely that act-situations provide the basis for the individuation of legal norms, has received
less attention. Raz addresses the question of individuation in his
The Concept of a Legal System (1970), contending that a primary
function of the law is to guide behavior and that this function is
seen more clearly if legal norms are formulated so as to reflect it. au
Honore disagrees with both contentions. The main function of the
law is "to strengthen the motives which citizens hav.e to obey
certain prescriptions in certain situations," and, in any case, the
actual form of a law is not deducible from its function {p. 104).
Although Bentham's enterprise is wrongheaded, Honore· continues, it does not follow that a classification of legal rules is
without value. Discourse and argument in the law require a modicum of conceptual order, that is, a scheme of legal categories and
a classification of rule-types, and these requirements of professional-as distinct from philosophical-discourse prompt Honore
to offer his own classificatory scheme. He begins with two formal
properties of legal rules. The first is generality, a property he
draws from our understanding of "rule" as something that by its
nature can be applied repeatedly. (One may contrast ''rule,"
here, with "ruling" and "holding"; neither of the latter is general.) Honore recognizes exceptions to his claim that generality
is a formal property of legal rules, for example, "existence laws"
establishing a particular legal practice or institution (" 'there
shall be a Crown Court in England and Wales which shall be a
court of record,'" Courts Act 1971, §4(1) [p. 108]), but with
virtually all other rules, including legal definitions and interpretations, generality is fundamental. A second property of legal
39. J. RAz, supra note 36, at 145, quoted at p. 103.
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rules, Honore says, is the possibility of arguing for an exception
to the rule, even if no exception has been recognized heretofore
(pp. 108-09). Here he appeals to the familiar idea that the law
"requires a margin of flexibility" in order to adapt to changing
conditions (p. 110).
The next step in developing a legal classificatory scheme
based on professional, not philosophical, requirements is a statement of the various rule-types. Here Honore is at his best. He
conceives of his task as showing how the law transforms "the data
of ordinary life into those of a special drama with its own personages, costumes, and conventions" and how the law also invents
"new personages and relationships not found in the state of nature" (p. 112). As he sees it, there are six classes of laws:
1. Existence laws create, destroy, or provide for the existence or
non-existence of entities.
2. Rules of inference provide how facts may or must or should
preferably be proved and what inferences may or must or should
preferably be drawn from evidence.
3. Categorizing rules explain how to translate actions, events,
and other facts into the appropriate categories.
4. Rules of scope fix the scope of other rules.
5. Position-specifying rules set out the legal position of persons
or things in terms of rights, liabilities, status, and the like.
6. Directly normative rules (which are few in number but important) guide the conduct of the citizen as such. [P. 112]
An example illustrating what Honore has in mind may be drawn
from classes 1, 3, and 5. An "existence law," mentioned above as

an exception to Honore's formal property of generality, prescribes
"that there is a legal ·interest in land known as an estate in fee
simple in possession. A categorizing rule .specifies how such an
interest may be acquired, transferred, or lost. A positionspecifying rule prescribes what the legal position (rights, liabilities, etc.) of the holder of the fee simple in possession is" (pp. 11213).

All of this is suggestive, and if Honore can develop the classificatory scheme beyond these bare outlines, the result, a far more
discrete picture of the structure oflaws than is presently available
in the literature, will be welcome indeed. Still, I think Honore
could have said all he wants to say on the classification of ruletypes without his dubious criticism of Bentham and
on individuation. The rationale for a program of individuation is determined by the problems that may be resolved thereby, and it is
hard to see how an out-of-hand rejection like Honore's has any
point. Suppose one were to contend that no logical relations exist

Raz
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between legal norms, while conceding that the internal structure
of a given norm can be understood in terms of logical relations.
Hans Kelsen, for example, makes just such a contention in his
later work. 40 By appealing to a doctrine of individuation, one may
be able to assess Kelsen's claims, since the doctrine, properly
developed, would provide a means of determining where the internal structure of a given norm leaves off and that of the next
begins. More precisely, it would enable one to develop a criterion
of identity for legal norms independently of what one knows
about the logical relations between norms or between parts of
norms. It is not obvious that a doctrine of individuation requires
what Honore attributes to Bentham, namely a "belief in metaphysical legal units" (p. 107); and without a doctrine of individuation, certain basic questions in legal philosophy are difficult,. perhaps impossible, to answer.
III.

MACCORMICK'S DEFENSE OF THE INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS

If the topic of legal rules dominated work in the philosophy
of law for the decade following publication of The Concept of
Law, it has recently yielded to questions about legal rights, a shift
owing in no small part to Ronald Dworkin's work. 41 While Dworkin's interest in rights is largely normative, the traditional British
interest in rights remains conceptual. That is, while Dworkin is
primarily concerned with questions about the justification of
rights, the British are concerned with the venerable philosophical
question of what rights are. To be sure, interest in the normative
on the one hand and in the conceptual on the other are not mutually exclusive. Attention to conceptual questions about rights
is evident in some ofDworkin's work, 42 and recent British writers,
among them D.N. MacCormick, are giving greater consideration
to normative questions. 43
Two conceptual theories of rights compete for favor in con40. On Kelsen's categorical denial of logical relations between legal norms, see his
paper, Law and Logic, in H. KELSEN, ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 228-63 (0.
Weinberger ed., P. Heath trans. 1974). On the complex structure of so-called complete
legal norms (vollstandige Rechtsnormen), see REINE REcHTSLEHRE, supra note 19, §§ 6(e),
35(d); R. WALTER, DER AUFBAU DER REcHTSORDNUNG 17-19 (2d ed. 1974).
41. See references at note 12 supra.
42. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 188-89, and the critical rejoinder in
Finnis, supra note 12, at 382-85.
43. See MacCormick, Children's Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right, 62 Ancmv
FOR RECHTS- UND SozIALPHILOSOPHIE 305 (1976); MacCormick, The Obligation of
Reparation, 78 PRoc. AnlsTOTELIAN SoCY. 175 (1978).
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temporary British discussions-first, the interest theory, which ·
numbers Jeremy Bentham and Rudolph von Jhering among its
proponents, and which focuses on the interests or benefits that
accrue to the right-holder by virtue of the right; and, second, the
will theory, adumbrated by John Austin (among others), which
focuses on the preeminence of the will of the right-holder over
that of the duty-bearer. D.N. MacCormick vigorously defends the
interest theory in the Festschrift, while Hart himself, in a paper
written for the Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series),
develops and defends a version of the will theory. 44
Hart's critique of the interest theory on the well-known point
of superfluity and his defense of the will theory against the same
charge are helpful in distinguishing between the theories generally. In Hart's words,
if to say that an individual has . . . a right means no more than
that he is the intended beneficiary of a duty, then "a right" in ,this
sense may be an unnecessary, and perhaps confusing, term in the
description of the law; since all that can be said in a terminology
of such rights can be and indeed is best said in the indispensable
terminology of duty. 45

The will theory, on the other hand, is not vulnerable to the
charge of superfluity. As Hart argues, the terminology of rights
is distinguished from the terminology of! duty by appeal to the
preeminence of the right-holder's will. The right-holder has a
number of "legally protected choices" vis-a-vis the duty-bearer.
For example, right-holder A may choose not to require B's performance, may waive enforcement of B's duty in the event of a
breach, or, after a judgment favorable to A, may waive B's obligation to pay compensation. 48
To treat the right-holder as having legal power or control over
the duty-bearer requires, however, that the application of the will
theory be limited for the most part to private law. Broader application of the theory gives rise to obvious counter-examples, as, for
instance, in the criminal law, where one does not have power to
44. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND
SERIES) 171-201 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973).
45. Id. at 190, quoted at p. 199. That Bentham regards a terminology of rights as
superfluous is suggested in such passages as the following: "An act is a real entity: a law
is another. A duty or obligation is a fictitious entity conceived as resulting from the union
of the two former. A law commanding or forbidding an act thereby creates a duty or
obligation. A right is another fictitious entity, a kind of secondary fictitious entity, resulting out of a duty." J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 293-94 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970).
46. Hart, supra note 44, at 192.
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release another from legally-imposed duties. Hart recognizes the
limits of the will theory. He invokes the old Austinian distinction
between the "relative" duties of the private law (duties reflecting
correlative rights) and the nonrelative or "absolute" duties of the
criminal law, and limits his application of the will theory to the
former. 47
MacCormick, effectively criticizing the will theory, makes
the most of its limitation to private law. In particular, he argues
that the inability of the will theory to account for certain rights
qua immunities is a grave defect. Some immunities, for example,
one's immunity from being divested of ownership, are waivable
by the right-holder. On the other hand, immunities in public law,
for example, one's right of free speech, are not waivable. If A's
right of free speech is analyzed in terms of (i) the state's disability
to interfere with A's speaking out (excepting, of course, cases of
the shouting-"fire"-in-a-crowded-theatre variety) and (ii) the
state's disability to change the relation at (i), even with A's consent, then A has no power to waive his right to free speech. Such
rights qua immunities, familiar in the Western democracies as
constitutionally protected rights, are commonly regarded as the
most fundamental of rights. Yet according to the will theory, they
are not rights at all. Or at any rate, the very possibility of giving
any account of them is precluded. In MacCormick's pointed
words,
it appears that [the constitutionally protected right qua immunity], be it ever so advantageous from the point of view of securing
liberty, is so forceful as to thrust liberty beyond the realm of 'right'
altogether. If there be no power to waive or assert the immunity,
the claim, or whatever, upon some matter, upon that matter there
is, by definition, no right either. [P. 196]

Having thus criticized the will theory, MacCormick develops
the rudiments of an interest theory that is, he argues, not vulnerable to Hart's charge of superfluity. MacCormick's critical argument turns on an analysis of a problem about succession, a topic
that the nineteenth-century classical legal positivist, Sir William
Markby, introduces in these terms:
a man carries about with him (so to speak) a vast mass or bundle
of rights and obligations, which are attached to himself, in the
sense that they are conceived as binding him or belonging to
him. . . . What becomes of these rights and obligations when the
person dies to whom they are attached? Do they also perish? Hnot,
47. See id. at 191-95.
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on whom do they devolve? That is determined by . . . the law of
succession. 48

One aspect of the topic introduced by Markby, namely intestate
succession, is dealt with in section 2(1)(a) of Scotland's Succession Act (1964): "Where an intestate is survived by children, they
shall have right to the whole of the intestate estate." (Quoted at
p. 200. 49 ) MacCormick uses the Act as the basis for arguing that
the right in question may vest before the corresponding duty does
and that the right may even serve as the "ground" of the duty.
Both his first conclusion, the temporal priority of the right, and
his second, its logical priority, count against the charge that the
interest theory is redundant. That is, if the right is temporally or
logically prior to the corresponding duty, it cannot be understood
solely in terms of the duty, and the interest theory-at least on
that score-is vindicated. Of course the latter of MacCormick's
conclusions, that of logical priority, is far stronger than that of
temporal priority, for temporal priority leaves open the possibility of logical nonpriority, precisely what logical priority, if correct, rules out. However, while MacCormick's conclusion of logical priority may indeed be correct, I believe that his argument for
logical priority fails.
How, exactly, does MacCormick proceed? When a person
dies intestate in Scotland, the right to the "intestate estate" automatically vests in the surviving children. This vesting is itself
sufficient to establish MacCormick's first claim, for the vesting
of the right to the estate, as recognized in the 1964 Act, may be
said to be temporally prior to the vesting of any correlative duty
in the executor. At the moment the right vests, the executor has
not yet been appointed.
MacCormick goes on to claim that such a right may be understood as a "ground" for appointment as executor of the estate-appointment, that is, as duty-bearer. Why? Because the
Succession Act indicates that as right-holders the surviving children are the prime candidates for appointment as executor. That
is, "one of the intestate's children may, because of this right
conferred on him by the Act, have a resultant preferential right
to be [appointed] as executor" (p. 201). MacCormick concludes
that because the right is a ground for appointment, it is "logically
prior" to the corresponding duty. As· he puts it,
48. W. MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW § 771 (6th ed. 1905).
49. Succession (Scotland) Act, 1964, § 2(1)(a).
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the vesting of the right in a given individual is a ground for confirming him in that office to which is attached the duty correlative
to the like rights of his brothers and sisters; so that in this context
right is logically prior to duty as well [as temporally prior]. [P.
201]

The argument MacCormick offers for logical priority is, however, problematic. He properly distinguishes, in the 1964 Act,
between (i) the vested right of the surviving children to the estate
and (ii) the "preferential right" of the surviving children to appointment to the office of executor. Moreover, he shows that there
is a relation of presupposition here; that is, (ii) presupposes (i).
The analysis calls, though, for an additional distinction, namely
between (ii) the ''preferential right" and (iii) the duties attaching
to the office of executor. Here MacCormick encounters difficulties. They stem, I believe, from his failure to see that the duties
attaching to the office of executor are not correlative to the
"preferential right" of appointment to that office. That is, while
the "preferential right" of an individual, say A, to appointment
as executor presupposes that a right to the estate has vested in
A, the relation concerns only the question of who will be appointed executor, not what the executor, once appointed, is to do.
If the duties attaching to the office of executor were correlative
to the "preferential right" to that office, then one could show a
second relation of presupposition, namely (iii)'s presupposing (ii),
just as (ii) presupposes (i). Given both these relations, then the
missing link, (iii)'s presupposing (i), establishing the "logical
priority" of (i) over (iii), would follow by appeal to the logical law
of transitivity. In the 1964 Act, however, the duties of the executor are defined independently of both the vested right and the
"preferential right." As MacCormick himself puts it, one's appointment as executor "will in turn result in his incurring the
duties of executor, including the duty of distributing the intestate
estate to those (including himself) who have right thereto under
section 2(1)(a) of the 1964 Act" (p. 201). 50 The argument that the
vested right to the estate is "logically prior" to the correlative
duty is, therefore, unsound.
It does not follow, of course, that MacCormick's conclusion
is false; I claim only that he has not shown it to be true. As I
suggested above, some support for his position may be had by
50. See id. § 2(1)(a) (vested right), § 5(2) ("preferential right"). Various sections of
the act that define the duties of the executor are summarized in M. MERTON, THE SuccESs10N (ScoTLANo) A<:r OF 1964 (2d ed. 1969), cited at p. 200.
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appeal to the notion of the temporal priority of the right, and it
may well be possible to construct an argument for its logical
priority too. Such an argument would be welcome, for MacCormick's approach to the general conceptual problem of rights is a
promising one. For example, he uses in a suggestive way Bentham's notions of "investitive" provisions (establishing the conditions whereby a right vests in qualified individuals),
"consequential" provisions (establishing the various normative
protections enjoyed by right-holders), and "divestitive" provisions (establishing the conditions whereby a right is transferred
or "lost") {p. 207). 51 More generally, he begins with legal rights
rather than with the quasi-logical notions familiar from analytical jurisprudence, an approach that enables him to take account
of what is actually understood in the law by the language of
rights. In this respect his approach is not unlike Honore's, who,
as we have seen, develops a "professional" taxonomy of rules,
rather than a philosophical one. As a point of departure, a
perspective from within the law, on rights as on rules, is necessary
if we are to arrive at a more refined, discrete analysis of these
notions. Finally, in developing a broad, interest theory of rights,
MacCormick's work holds open the prospect of a truly general
theory; his own criticism of the will theory stems from the conviction, entirely justified in my view, that it is too narrow.
What about Hart? His contribution to the analysis of legal
rules is well known, and he has made a fundamental, if less obvious, contribution to the study of legal rights too. Aside from his
stimulating defense of the will theory, which prompted MacCormick's own paper, it is Hart who has generated widespread interest in the legal philosphy of Jeremy Bentham:--through his editorial labors52 and through a number of important papers. 53 Since
it is Bentham's interest theory of rights that MacCormick de51. See MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, 90 LAw Q. REv. 102, 106-08 passim
(1974) (Inaugural Lecture, University of Edinburgh).
52. Hart has edited J. BENTHAM, COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES and A FRAGMENT
ON GOVERNMENT, supra note 9; J. BENTHAM, AN lNTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION, supra note 38; J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL, supra note 45.
53. Bentham and the United States of America, supra note 9; Bentham and the
Demystification of the Law, 36 Moo. L. REv. 2 (1973); Bentham on Legal Rights, supra
note 44; Bentham on Legal Powers, 81 YALE L.J. 799 (1972); Bentham's "Of Laws in
General", supra note 13; Bentham on Sovereignty, 2 IR. Jtm. 327 (1967), reprinted in
JEREMY BENTHAM-TEN CRlTICAL ESSAYS 145 (B. Parekh ed. 1974); Beccaria and Bentham,
Arn DEL coNVEGNO INTERNAZIONALE su CESARE BECCARIA, Accademia delle Scienze di Torino
(Memorials of the Academy, ser. 4a, no. 9, 1966); Bentham, 48 PROC. BRIT. AcAD. 297
(1962), reprinted in JEREMY BENTHAM-TEN CRIT1cAL ESSAYS, supra at 73.
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fends (just as it is Bentham's theory of individuation to which
Honore reacts), Hart's legacy to jurisprudence is conspicuous in
the Festschrift papers not only from his own work, but from this
resuscitation of the greatest of his intellectual ancestors.

